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ABSTRACT 
Schematic Effects on Probability Problem Solving 
S. Sonia Gugga 
Three studies examined context effects on solving probability problems.  Variants of 
word problems were written with cover stories which differed with respect to social or 
temporal schemas, while maintaining formal problem structure and solution procedure.  In the 
first of these studies it was shown that problems depicting schemas in which randomness was 
inappropriate or unexpected for the social situation were solved less often than problems 
depicting schemas in which randomness was appropriate.  Another set of two studies examined 
temporal and causal schemas, in which the convention is that events are considered in forward 
direction.  Pairs of conditional probability (CP) problems were written depicting events E1 and 
E2, such that E1 either occurs before E2 or causes E2.  Problems were defined with respect to the 
order of events expressed in CPs, so that P(E2| E1) represents the CP in schema-consistent, intact 
order by considering the occurrence of E1 before E2, while P(E1|E2) represents CP in schema-
inconsistent, inverted order.  Introductory statistics students had greater difficulty encoding CP 
for events in schema-inconsistent order than CP of events in conventional deterministic order. 
The differential effects of schematic context on solving probability problems identify 
specific conditions and sources of bias in human reasoning under uncertainty.  In addition, these 
biases may be influential when evaluating empirical findings in a manner similar to that 
demonstrated in this paper experimentally, and may have implications for how social scientists 
are trained in research methodology. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
With respect to educational and social policy, renewed emphasis on evidence-based 
practice and the assessment of student learning has highlighted the importance of nuanced 
understanding of statistical inference for social scientists, educators, and policymakers (Gal, 
2005; Milton, 2006; Slavin, 2004, 2008).  There has been debate as to the quality of statistical 
training for social scientists, in that it has been criticized for its overreliance on narrow 
methodologies as well as inadequately preparing both producers and consumers of research 
literature (Henson, Hull, & Williams, 2010; Olani, Harskamp, Hoekstra, & van der Werf, 2010; 
Pallas, 2001; Slavin, 2004).  With respect to consumers of scientific literature, a basic 
understanding of the process of statistical inference is central to evaluating the validity and 
scope of social science research (Neath, 2010; Paris & Luo, 2010; Slavin, 2003, 2004, 2008; 
Sloane, 2008) which may significantly affect how empirical evidence is implicated in major 
policy decisions, such as the use of students' standardized test scores to evaluate teacher 
effectiveness. 
A major body of work into statistical reasoning has illustrated that individuals often 
disregard statistically prescribed processes, employing heuristics and biases which often 
produce invalid inferences (see Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Cohen, 1981; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 
2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & 
Kunda, 1993; Stanovich, Toplak, & West, 2008; and Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1980 for 
extensive treatments of the debate).  It would be difficult to be optimistic about the efficacy of 
policy enacted from faulty inferences, and while many of the aforementioned studies 
demonstrate the persistence of biases in both the statistically naïve and individuals with 
extensive statistical training, another body of work exhibits particular contexts which may 
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improve performance on judgments under uncertainty.   Improvement has been affected by 
training, expression of likelihood in frequency formats, or by expressing real-world application 
to contexts in which individuals are more likely to reason probabilistically with respect to 
causal or social schemas (Fox & Levav, 2004; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, 2007; Girotto & 
Gonzalez, 2007; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007). 
In cognition research, the concept of schema is often invoked to describe a hierarchically 
structured unit of knowledge.  Through experience, individuals form schemas consisting of 
elements and the relationships among them.  Schemas serve to reduce a wealth of phenomena 
into meaningful, manageable units, producing categories that ultimately aid in long-term 
memory (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Marshall, 1993; Nisbett, et al., 1993; Schank & Abelson, 
1977).  The novice-expert distinction in problem-solving research is often delineated by experts’ 
recognition of appropriate schemas depending on deep formal problem structure.  For novice 
problem-solvers, it has been shown that the surface features of a problem may provide cues to an 
inappropriate formal solution schema (Anderson & Thompson, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 
Reusser, 1988; Ross, 1984, 1989). 
A mathematical word problem's cover story is its real-world context and semantic 
content, considered surface features, in that they are usually not intended to affect a problem's 
technical difficulty or formal solution processes.  When a cover story relates to social 
interactions, however, pragmatic reasoning schemas may be invoked in the mind of the problem 
solver.  Generally, “pragmatic reasoning schemas” embody the rules and relationships of real-
world social situations, abstracted and classified (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cheng, Holyoak, 
Nisbett, & Oliver, 1993; Cheng & Nisbett, 1993).  The difficulty many problem-solvers face in 
correctly solving conditional reasoning if-then problems posed in the abstract has been shown to 
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be alleviated by placing the problem within a pragmatic, deontic context, such as permission, 
obligation, cheating, or cost-benefit paradigms (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides, 1989).   
Problems in the earliest phases of a course in probability theory generally deal with 
randomizing devices – balls in urns, shuffled decks of cards, flipped coins, or rolled dice.  Their 
stochasticity is apparent: many people are already familiar with them through games of chance.  
Social science students new to the field of statistical inference often have difficulty transferring 
probabilistic principles from games of chance to human behavior, in which the randomness of 
the problem situation is less apparent (Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1993; 
Howell & Burnett, 1978; Teigen & Keren, 2007)  While if-then problems in a pragmatic social 
context are easier to solve than abstract versions, work in the field has shown that, in 
probability problem solving, replacing randomizing devices with anthropomorphic context 
tends to increase the difficulty of the problem rather than alleviate it (Bassok, Wu, & Olseth, 
1995; Falk & Lann, 2008).  It may be that individuals have more difficulty reasoning 
probabilistically about people in social contexts rather than about non-human entities due to 
the implicit causal (rather than stochastic) schemas that people's beliefs or action are caused by 
certain internal traits or intention (Schwartz & Goldman, 1996; Windschitl & Wells, 1998).  
With respect to training in the social sciences, however, it is necessary to understand that 
human behavior can have a stochastic component of variability.   
The claim made here is that problem solving in probability is particularly affected by 
domain-specific biases in probabilistic reasoning.  It is worth noting that this paper is not 
intended to enforce or dispute the heuristics and biases view that human judgment under 
uncertainty is broadly flawed and does not conform to what is considered rational in light of 
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formal statistical rules.   Rather, the studies described in this paper will illustrate particular 
circumstances in which heuristics and biases may be differentially exhibited during probability 
problem solving, with respect to the schemas depicted in those problems’ cover stories.  The 
studies will be discussed in terms of frameworks constructed to describe probabilistic reasoning 
processes uniquely.   
One of the frameworks describes discrepancies between formal quantitative 
probabilistic assessments (Type 2) and on-the-fly, qualitative probabilistic judgments (Type 1), 
and has led to a theory of dual-systems representations for probability judgments (Evans & 
Frankish, 2008; Fox & Levav, 2004; Sloman, 1996; Sloman & Rips, 1998; Smith & Collins, 2009; 
Stanovich, et al., 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Windschitl & Krizan, 2005; Windschitl & 
Wells, 1998).  While the two processes have been well-differentiated, it remains to be 
determined how they may interact in probability problem solving contexts.  Individuals have 
been shown to have a strong bias toward Type 1 processes for evaluating social behavior or 
characteristics: people generally have difficulty understanding social behavior in strictly 
probabilistic terms.  It may be that the interaction of the two processes depends on the details of 
the schematic representation of the elements of the problem.  The effect of adjustments on 
schematic elements of items has not yet been studied in a probability problem solving context. 
Within these theoretical frameworks, experimentally manipulating pragmatic schemas 
within isomorphic probability problems (while controlling for formal solution schema) would 
yield insights into how pragmatic schemas affect the difficulty of solving probability problems.  
The implications of this theoretical framework was explored using a mix of classroom 
experiments, conducted in introductory probability and statistics courses in a graduate school 
   5 
 
of education, and laboratory experiments conducted online.  It was thought that including 
participants from populations other than that of students in social sciences would inform the 
generalizability of results and allow for comparisons with previous findings.  The research 
program had several phases, each aimed at understanding particular schematic representations. 
The first of the real-world schemas that was addressed used probability problems 
involving real-world situations in which a “first-come, first-served” schema was replaced by 
random ordering.  Subjects' performance on these problems was compared with performance on 
problems in which randomness is an inherent aspect of the social situation described in the 
cover story.  With respect to real-world context, it was expected that performance would differ 
on problems in which randomness was imposed compared to problems in which randomness 
was endemic.  Randomness would be expected in situations in which people are selected by 
lottery or draw items blindly from a container.   
Another pair of studies addressed the direction of temporality and causation, examining 
whether inverting the temporal direction of a schema would affect the difficulty of a conditional 
probability problem.  It was hypothesized that it would be easier for individuals to reason 
forwards regarding temporal or causal events given the deterministic nature of causal and, by 
extension, temporal schemas (Cheng & Nisbett, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1980).  In other 
words, it would be easier for subjects to calculate the conditional probability of an event given 
the probability of events preceding it versus calculating the probability of an event given the 
probability of events occurring later.  Similarly, it was expected that problems asking for the 
conditional probability of an effect given the probability of its cause(s) would be easier than 
problems asking for the probability of a cause given the probability of its effect(s).  It was 
supposed that inverting the direction of determination should introduce an additional level of 
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difficulty to the problem.  It was also expected that the perceived causal strength between 
events would mediate the effect.  In addition, I intend to illustrate how schematic effects on 
probability problem solving may inform instruction on statistical inference and the evaluation of 
scientific data. 
The experiments discussed yield insights into how probability problems are categorized 
and solved, what effects these pragmatic schemas have on problem-solving success, and how 
they may inform peculiarities about probabilistic reasoning in general.  
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
A fairly influential body of research in cognition has demonstrated that human judgment 
under uncertainly falls somewhere on the spectrum between vulnerable to biases and not rational 
(Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Bar-Hillel & Falk, 1982; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Falk, 1989; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Mackie, 1981; Nisbett, et al., 1993; Rips, 1994; Stanovich, et al., 2008; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1980).  Many of these studies have utilized tasks which elicit 
qualitative probabilistic judgments or attributions, rather than the formal statistical processes 
which define the prescriptive standard of rationality.  Conversely, another vein of research 
disputes the validity of the broad indictment of probabilistic reasoning by addressing the 
disconnect between expecting probabilistic judgments on experimental tasks that do not 
demand formal processes (Windschitl & Krizan, 2005), raising theoretical objections to the 
interpretation of results (Cohen, 1981), or illustrating conditions in which performance on 
statistical reasoning tasks may be improved through changes to context (Fong, et al., 1993; Fox 
& Levav, 2004; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, 2007; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007; Schurr & Erev, 
2007; Windschitl & Wells, 1998).  A number of more recent studies have utilized quantitative 
problem-solving tasks, illustrating differential effects on computational problem solving 
(Fantino & Stolarz, 2007; Fox & Levav, 2004; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Krynski & 
Tenenbaum, 2007; Martin & Bassok, 2005; Villejoubert & Mandel, 2002; Wright & Murphy, 
1984). 
Computational models of mathematical problem solving define the methods by which 
people solve problems using methods other than direct linear application of formal, prescribed 
rules.  Computational models often describe how problem solving is affected by schematic 
representations of a word problem's context (Sweller, 1988; Vosniadou, 1989; Windschitl & 
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Wells, 1998).  Broadly speaking, in cognitive research, the wealth of phenomena in the world are 
organized into schemas, in which units of information are abstracted and defined along with the 
relationships among them (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Sweller, 1988).  With respect to problem 
solving, a schema serves as a structuring framework, defining elements such as problem type 
with associated solution procedures (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cheng, et al., 1993; Chi, Feltovich, 
& Glaser, 1981; Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Hinsley, Hayes, & Simon, 1977; 
Marshall, 1993; Newell & Simon, 1972; Nisbett, 1993; Pólya, 1941, 1954a, 2004; Rips, 1994; Ross, 
1989; Sweller, 1988).  Marshall (1993) further defined the elements of a problem schema as 
consisting of feature elements, constraints, planning, and execution.  The utility of a schema is 
primarily to aid long-term memory, as the elements of a schema are stored such that retrieval of 
one element will make its associated elements more salient.  Studies of the distinction between 
expert and novice approaches to problem solving have yielded insights into how schematic 
representation of problems change with increased experience.  Notably, novices tend to focus on 
contextual cues with respect to categorizing problems, creating schemas based on cover story.   
Experts more readily categorize problems based on schemas defined by domain-specific rules or 
solution procedure.  This distinction has been demonstrated with problems in the domain of 
physics (Chi, et al., 1981; Chi, et al., 1982; Larkin, Heller, & Greeno, 1980; Larkin, McDermott, 
Simon, & Simon, 1980; Larkin & Simon, 1987), as well as algebra (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 
Hinsley, et al., 1977).  Experts’ categorization of problems by their deep structure facilitates 
problem solving by the schematic association of problem type and solution procedure, through 
what is characterized as schema induction (Gick & Holyoak, 1980).  Schema induction describes 
the process by which identification of a problem’s type based on structural elements cues a 
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correct solution procedure; identifying problem type based on spurious elements may cue an 
incorrect solution procedure and produce an incorrect answer. 
Computational models of problem solving explain many of the processes that novice 
problem solvers engage when approaching a novel problem, including the effect of problem 
context (Martin & Bassok, 2005; Reusser, 1988; Ross, 1989).  This has been studied extensively 
with respect to the four-card if-then conditional reasoning task proposed in abstract by Wason 
(1968), i.e., the selection task.  In the selection task, individuals are asked to verify a logical 
implication rule expressed in "if p, then q" form.  A number of investigators have shown that 
placing the problem within a pragmatic context, as summarized in Table 1, significantly 
increases the proportion of problem solvers who correctly solve the problem.  Investigators, 
however, have differing explanations for these effects, since the selection task is usually 
expressed in terms of deontic systems (i.e., those defining norms of necessity and obligation) 
Table 1  
Expression of the Selection Task Rule in Abstract and Deontic Contexts 
Context Rule 
Abstract 
If there is a square on one side of  the card, then there is a red scribble on the  
other side  (Wason, 1968). 
Permission 
If a customer is drinking an alcoholic beverage, then he or she must be over 
twenty-one (Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Oliver, 1993). 
Obligation 
If one works for the armed forces, then one must vote in the elections (Cheng, et 
al., 1993). 
Private Exchange 
If you give me your ostrich eggshell, then I’ll give you duiker meat (Cosmides, 
1989). 
Cost-benefit If you spend over £100, then you will receive a free gift (Rips, 1994). 
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(Cosmides, 1989; Rips,  1994).  Cheng and Holyoak (1985) cite the effect of pragmatic schemas, 
noting that there are context-dependent schematic representations of permission and obligation 
paradigms which are engaged in those contexts.  Cosmides, rather than credit the concept of 
pragmatic schema, attributes the effect to the evolutionary salience of obeying or violating social 
contracts for individuals’ enhanced performance on these problems.   
A number of the pragmatic schemas applied to the selection task have been studied 
within the context of event schemas, or scripts, by which individual events are categorized into 
generalized structures.  Shank and Abelson (1977) illustrated that within a restaurant script 
there are several expected events, including being seated at a table, ordering from a menu, being 
served food, eating, and paying the bill.  Scripts are shared natural categories similar to those for 
objects; 73% of individuals sampled independently cited each of the events previously 
mentioned when asked to list the events that occur during a restaurant visit.  These categories 
also play a role in what is recalled about an experience.  Individuals are more likely to recall 
script elements rather than details which are not classified by script elements (Bower, Black, & 
Turner, 1979).  Calling upon an element of a script in word problems facilitates recall of related 
elements of that script, similar to the process of schema induction described by Gick and 
Holyoak for problem type and problem solution (1980).  If the context of a word problem recalls 
an established script, the salience of that script may in part affect performance on the problem. 
In probability problem solving, however, pragmatic context has not been shown to 
alleviate item difficulty.  Randomness is often a necessary factor in probability problems, and 
individuals readily understand randomness with respect to games of chance.  Problems 
involving cards, dice, or balls in urns do not require special consideration with respect to 
stochasticity (Fong, et al., 1993; Howell & Burnett, 1978; Teigen & Keren, 2007).  When these 
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same problems are expressed in a human or social context, however, problem solving is often 
impeded.  For example, with respect to the much studied three-card (i.e., “Monty’s dilemma”) 
problem, correct performance on the problem in its original context was impeded when it was 
expressed with pairs of people replacing the sides of a card, particularly when those people were 
individualized and named (Falk & Lann, 2008; Fox & Levav, 2004).  There have been a number 
of studies illustrating that individuals have difficulty applying notions of randomness in social 
judgments (Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Lehman, Lempert, & Nisbett, 1993; Nisbett, Fong, Lehman, 
& Cheng, 1987; Windschitl & Wells, 1998).  Given instruction in the application of the law of 
large numbers, study participants have been shown to more readily apply the principle to 
judgments regarding athletic skill or job performance rather than friendliness or honesty 
(Nisbett, et al., 1993).  Individuals generally have difficulty differentiating between cause and 
chance when reasoning about people probabilistically, often making what has been termed a 
covariance assumption: rather than attributing human behavior to chance, people tend to assume 
that behaviors or opinions are determined exclusively by internal factors (Schwartz & 
Goldman, 1996).  Reasoning probabilistically about people can be complicated by considering 
intent, which is not the case when reasoning about cards or dice (Howell & Burnett, 1978; 
Nisbett, et al., 1987).  
The implicit confounding of the attribution of both cause and chance factors on an 
outcome may offer insights as to why problem solving in probability is not regularly facilitated 
by social-pragmatic context.  Probability is particularly affected by domain-specific biases that 
do not affect performance on if-then implication tasks.  Research in this field has documented 
discrepancies between formal quantitative probabilistic assessments and on-the-fly, qualitative 
probabilistic judgments, leading to a generalized theory of dual-systems representations for 
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probability judgments.  These two processes have been contrasted in terms of extensional versus 
intuitive (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983); rational versus experiential (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & 
Heier, 1996); or rule-based versus associative (Sloman, 1996), among others.  For the purposes of 
this paper, extensional, rational, and rule-based processes will be referred to as Type 2 and 
intuitive, experiential, and associative processes will be referred to as Type 1, as summarized by 
Evans and Frankish (2008, see also Stanovich, Toplak, & West, 2008).  Type 2 processes engage 
the formal procedures prescribed by probability theory.  Type 1 processes engage the heuristics 
that have been defined by how they do not adhere to formal probability theory, such as base-rate 
neglect, the conjunction fallacy, and availability bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1980, 1983).  
For individuals with the appropriate training, Type 2 processes are dominant in situations 
requiring quantitative judgments and non-social context.  For these same individuals, Type 1 
processes are usually engaged when reasoning about social situations, indicating the persistence 
of these heuristics in certain contexts. 
While the two processes have been well-differentiated, it remains to be determined how 
they may interact in probability problem solving contexts.  Namely, how may the heuristics 
employed in Type 1 probability judgments affect formal calculations requiring Type 2 processes?  
Some research has indicated that, with respect to social judgments, Type 1 reasoning biases can 
be superseded by the introduction of a quantifiable metric of comparison, which seems to cue 
formal Type 2 processes (Nisbett, et al., 1993).  Stanovich et al. (2008) term this process Type 2 
override, the process of suppressing Type 1 processes by separating the abstract formal schema 
from the individual problem schema.  The formal schema becomes a simulation representation of 
the problem space which can then be manipulated using formal solution processes.  Often the 
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recognition that a formal schema is applicable is facilitated by a randomness cue, which serves 
to introduce a stochastic component onto a situation in which it is not otherwise salient.  For 
example, the well-established restaurant script has been experimentally altered with the detail 
that an individual orders from an unreadable restaurant menu by dropping a pencil on the menu 
and requesting the item on which it lands (Fong, et al., 1993).  Type 2 override in probability 
problems with social context may be facilitated by a randomness cue or by demand 
characteristics of the item, which indicate that a formal quantitative assessment of 
mathematical probability is required over and above a quick judgment (Nisbett, et al., 1993). 
Models of problem solving have defined problem solving processes as sets of required 
skills or knowledge types as well as sequential sets of phases.  Some of these are more relevant as 
to when Type 2 override may be engaged.  Mayer (1992) included semantic knowledge, knowledge 
of the world, and schematic knowledge, knowledge of problem type, in a set of knowledge types 
necessary for problem solving.  These definitions parallel the Type 1-Type 2 distinction 
previously described.  Reusser (1996, see also Zahner & Corter, 2010) proposed a five-stage 
model of mathematical problem solving, with stage three being the phase during which the 
situation model of the problem is translated into formal mathematical representations.  In the 
example given above, it is during this phase of problem solving that the randomness cue of 
dropping the pencil on the menu included in the situational model of the problem would be 
formalized in its mathematical solution.  With respect to dual-systems representations theory, 
Type 1 processes would typically be activated when considering real-world pragmatic schemata, 
Type 2 processes activated when considering formal solution schema, and both processes 
interact when negotiating an individual problem schema.  When the surface content of a 
problem reflects an established pragmatic schema, the ease with which specific elements of a 
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problem map onto the formal solution schema can be affected by the degree to which the 
problem context adheres to or deviates from the relevant real-world schema (Bassok, et al., 1995; 
Falk & Lann, 2008; Martin & Bassok, 2005).  If so, then probability problem solving can be 
viewed as a three-way coordination and mapping process, associating real-world knowledge 
through pragmatic schemas to individual problem schemas to formal schemas.  To date, these 
processes have been studied with respect to general application of the law of large numbers or 
sampling methodology in a qualitative context.  The effects of these adjustments have not yet 
been studied in a probability problem solving context. 
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CHAPTER III:  STUDY 1 
Statement of the Problem  
Study 1 examines if probability problem solving is affected by whether randomness is 
appropriate to the pragmatic schema of an item's cover story.  It was expected that Type 1 and 
Type 2 processes would play a larger or smaller role in problem solving depending on the 
context of the problem's cover story.  Previous studies (Bassok, et al., 1995; Falk & Lann, 2008; 
Howell & Burnett, 1978; Schwartz & Goldman, 1996; Windschitl & Wells, 1998) have 
demonstrated that people have greater difficulty reasoning statistically about social situations or 
human behavior than about simple randomizing devices or abstract entities.  Much of the work 
in this area used tasks which do not require mathematical or formal quantitative solutions, 
while a few more recent studies have illustrated context effects using quantitative problem-
solving tasks as well.  Study 1 was designed to examine whether Type 1 reasoning interacts with 
Type 2 solution processes on a formally isometric permutation problem expressed through 
different cover stories.   
Cover stories for a probability problem were written depicting schemas in which 
individuals expect an element of randomness as well as those in which the social script dictates 
that a non-random ordering should be applied.  Cover stories in the randomness-appropriate-schema 
(RA) condition depicted randomizing devices such as cards or dice, as well as social situations 
in which random selection is consistent with the script, such as lotteries.   
Cover stories in the randomness-inappropriate-schema (RI) condition depict situations in 
which some identifiable non-arbitrary criterion of ordering is an essential element of the script.  
Specifically, the first-come, first-served (1C1S) line-waiting paradigm is an important aspect of 
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many service-related schemas, including the much studied restaurant script (Shank & Abelson, 
1977).  The 1C1S script element defines a sequence of events so that, among people waiting for 
some service, the first to arrive will be the first served, and so forth, in the order of arrival.  In 
experimental cover stories depicting this type of scenario, the expected 1C1S ordering is 
replaced with random ordering, which is inconsistent with the expected script.  By imposing the 
social schema onto a probability problem schema in which random assignment is required, 
individuals’ performance on the problem was expected to be altered.  With respect to Cheng 
and Holyoak’s pragmatic schema theory (1985), the problem would be rendered more difficult, 
as adding stochasticity to the problem schema would increase the conceptual distance between 
the problem context and the pragmatic schema.  Conversely, should the addition of stochasticity 
highlight the violation of the 1C1S rule, as Cosmides’s theory of social contract (1989) would 
predict, performance on the problem may be enhanced.  According to this view, individuals’ 
native sensitivity to cheating increases the salience of randomness in the inappropriate situation 
and may induce Type 2 override.   
Additional Conditions 
Variants of each primary randomness condition were designed to examine whether 
specific elements of a problem schema would affect performance on the item.   It was expected 
that within randomness-appropriate (RA) items, cover stories depicting randomizing devices 
would be solved more frequently than items depicting social schemas.  This condition sought to 
support the idea illustrated by Bassok and colleagues (1996) in which, using a common 
probability item involving permutations, a probability item in which computers were randomly 
assigned to secretaries was easier to solve than items in which secretaries were randomly 
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assigned to computers, even though each cover story described a situation in which randomness 
was expected. Changing the subject of the probability item from objects to people did not 
radically alter the script of the problem cover story but affected its difficulty.  To investigate this 
effect in Study 1, two types of RA problems were written with cover stories depicting either (a) 
randomizing devices or (b) randomizing people in social settings.  The items using randomizing 
devices depicted games of chance such as cards or drawing numbered balls.  The RA items with 
individuals in place of devices depicted social situations similar to a lottery, such as a Secret Santa 
gift exchange, in which people select gifts at random from a bag. 
The additional condition applied to RI items examined whether a randomness cue might 
induce Type 2 override and alleviate the difficulty of a probability problem.  As mentioned 
above, in a series of studies investigating the salience of random components of variance in 
“everyday” reasoning, Fong et al, (1986) imposed randomness on a situation in which it is 
unexpected.  When ordering a meal in a restaurant, people order food according to some 
criterion, whether it be calories, food allergy, or personal taste.  In their variation of the task, 
however, Fong et al. describe a cover story in which a man is in Japan on business and must 
order a meal from a menu in a language which he cannot read.  The businessman selects a meal 
randomly by ordering the item on which his pencil falls.  The man enjoys his meal and repeats 
the procedure at the restaurant another evening, yet is disappointed in his second meal.  Fong, et 
al.'s subjects who read this version of the story more often attributed the businessman’s 
disappointment to stochastic factors, relative to subjects who read a story in which the standard 
restaurant script was followed.  It was thought that the randomness cue highlighted the element 
of stochasticity, facilitating participants’ attributing variance in meal enjoyment to chance 
factors.  In addition, it has been shown that individuals are resistant to attributing variation to 
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"pure" randomness alone, preferring to attribute unexpected outcomes to unknown causal 
determinants (Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007; Luhmann & Ahn, 2005).  In addition, individuals 
prefer to bet on known odds of success of 50/50, rather than unknown, possibly better odds 
(Heath & Tversky, 1991).  In Study 1, the secondary condition within randomness inappropriate 
(RI) items tested this effect with cover stories written either (c) with a cue or (d) without a cue 
explaining why random assignment was imposed.  Cover stories in each secondary RI condition 
were identical except that one set of items included an explanation for why random selection 
has replaced 1C1S order.  The explanation provides a causal determinant in the problem's cover 
story and functions as the randomness cue.  It was hypothesized that the explanation would 
decrease the conceptual distance between the problem schema and social schema, facilitating 
solution of the problem. 
Method 
Participants 
Volunteers for Study 1 participated via the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) platform, 
which is an online labor market in which individuals are recruited for surveys as well as tasks 
which are difficult for computers and cannot be automated, such as image recognition and 
filtering for adult content (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012).  All AMT 
users must be over age 18 according to the terms of that website, although we excluded data for 
six individuals who reported their age less than 18 years.  Participants were further limited to 
those subjects with a proportion of accepted submissions of AMT tasks above 95% to exclude 
users ‘fishing’ for remuneration without reasonably expected effort.  This resulted in 394 
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participants (Table 2).  The AMT website is in English, so all participants were expected to have 
been proficient in English to a degree, regardless of native language. 
Materials 
Cover stories were written to present a single formal probability problem in different 
contexts.  The formal problem involved finding the likelihood of a single possible permutation of 
events.  Two cover stories were written for each of the four conditions, resulting in eight 
parallel, formally isometric probability items (Table 3).  
Procedure 
 Study 1 was administered online as an AMT Human Intelligence Task (HIT).  A HIT is a 
short task for which workers get paid a small amount.  The bulk of the tasks on AMT cannot be 
automated, that is, they entail activities on which humans outperform computers. 
Amazon Mechanical Turk workers browse or search for HITs by keyword.  Keywords 
defined for this task included probability thinking, word problems, math problem solving, and opinions.  
Clicking on the HIT title, "Solve a probability problem" took the AMT participant to a screen 
describing the task.  The instructions informed potential participants that they would be 
completing an introductory probability problem and suggested to have a pen, paper, and 
calculator at hand.  Users clicked a button labeled “Accept HIT”, upon which task appeared 
onscreen in a frame (Figure 1). 
The AMT algorithm allowed each of the eight probability problems to be presented randomly to 
participants.  The HIT containing these items appeared online between March and
Table 2














Total) 394 99 (25.1%) 98 (24.9%) 99 (25.1%) 98 (24.9%)
Age (years) M (SD) 28.4 (9.1) 27.6 (8.7) 29.7 (9.3) 28.0 (9.6) 28.4 (8.7)
Gender N (%)
Male 270 (68.5%) 73 (73.7%) 67 (67.7%) 64 (65.3%) 66 (67.3%)
Female 115 (29.2%) 23 (23.2%) 31 (31.3%) 31 (31.6%) 30 (30.6%)
Not reported 9 (2.3%) 3 (3.0%) 1 (1.0%) 3 (3.1%) 2 (2.0%)
Region/Language N (%)
English-speaking countries 275 (69.8%) 62 (62.6%) 75 (75.8%) 73 (74.5%) 65 (66.3%)
European, Spanish-speaking countries 46 (11.7%) 16 (16.2%) 8 (8.1%) 9 (9.2%) 13 (13.3%)
Asian countries 73 (18.5%) 21 (21.1%) 16 (16.3%) 16 (16.3%) 20 (20.4%)
Time on task (minutes) M (SD) 3.47 (2.6) 3.61 (2.6) 3.61 (2.2) 3.44 (2.4) 3.24 (2.3)
Note:  Statistical tests indicated no statistical differences among condition on these variables.
RANDOMNESS APPROPRIATE RANDOMNESS INAPPROPRIATE
20
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April 2011. Participants entered an answer in a text box below the item and had the 
option of commenting on their solution.  Below these text boxes, a list of relevant probability 
formulas (Figure A1) was presented, followed by some demographic items.  The "Submit" button 
followed the demographic items. 
Another procedure in addition to the "95% acceptance" rule was implemented to regulate 
quality of the data by limiting only one response per AMT worker.  AMT allowed each HIT to be 
accepted or rejected before participants were paid.  At any point while the HIT was active, 
investigators were able to download a file with participants’ response data and anonymous  
Table 3 
Study 1: Test Items by Condition 
RANDOMNESS APPROPRIATE 
Randomizing devices 
Eight cards numbered one through eight are shuffled. They are then dealt one at a time. What is 
the probability they are dealt in increasing numerical order? 
A special pool table at the pool hall has only eight balls numbered one through eight. To play, a 
customer inserts $2.00 and the balls are released into a tray in the side of the table. What is the 
probability that they appear in increasing numerical order? 
Social schema - consistent 
Day-use lockers at the gym are assigned randomly by selecting keys from a bowl.  The bowl 
contains keys numbered one though eight.  What is the probability that the eight locker keys get 
assigned in increasing numerical order? 
Eight 'Secret Santa' gifts of different value are in a bag.  What is the probability that the gifts are 
randomly selected in order from most to least expensive? 
 
   22 
 
identifiers, select which submissions to accept, and upload the file back to AMT.  The HIT 
instructions explicitly stated that only one HIT per worker ID would be accepted, yet several 
participants submitted multiple HITs.  In these cases only the first HIT submitted was accepted 
and the rejected tasks were returned to the item pool.  An additional constraint limited this 
occurrence: Participants’ worker IDs were compiled in a list and a rule applied so those workers' 
with IDs in the list were prohibited from further participation.  This method helped minimize 
the frequency of rejected HITs. Each participant was paid 50 cents for an accepted HIT. 
Table 3 (continued) 
Study 1: Test Items by Condition 
RANDOMNESS INAPPROPRIATE 
Social schema - inconsistent:  1C1S replaced with random order, with explanation 
Eight people are waiting in line to be served at the post office.  There is a fire alarm and the post 
office is evacuated.  It was a false alarm, but now the eight people cannot reassemble the line 
and must be served in random order.  What is the probability that they are served in the original 
order of the line? 
Eight parties are waiting for tables at a restaurant.  The restaurant computer has crashed, losing 
the waiting list.  Parties must now be seated in random order.  What is the probability that the 
parties are seated in the original order in which they arrived? 
Social schema - inconsistent:  1C1S replaced with random order, without explanation 
Eight people have arrived at the post office, but are served in random order.  What is the 
probability that they are served in the order of their arrival? 
Eight parties have arrived and are waiting for tables at a restaurant, but are seated in random 
order. What is the probability that the parties are seated in the order in which they arrived? 
Note: '1C1S' = First-come, first-served 
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Analyses 
Preliminary analyses indicated that there were no differences in proportion correct 
between pairs of items within each of the four conditions, so observations for both items within 
each condition were combined into a single group.  Due to the diversity in the sample, region 
was included as a control in analyses to account for possibility of cultural or linguistic effects 
(see Table 2).  Participants had been asked in which country or countries they were educated; 
these answers were then coded to group participants into three regions: English-speaking 
countries, Asia, and the rest of the world.  The groups are defined in Table A1 in Appendix A.  
Other covariates considered included gender, age, field of study, and a variable in which AMT 
had automatically collected data on the time spent on each HIT in seconds.  Preliminary 
analyses on these control variables showed mean time on task differed significantly among 
Figure 1
Study 1: Presentation of Each Probability Item on the Amazon Mechanical Turk Website
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region groups.  Other variables did not correlate with answering an item correctly and were not 
included in further analyses. 
A Generalized Linear Modeling (GZLM) procedure, SPSS GENLIN, was used to model 
these data according to a binary distribution with logit (i.e., log-odds) link.  This procedure is 
statistically more robust than procedures such as logistic regression in that GZLM does not 
require that the response data are distributed normally for valid results.  Parameter estimates 
can be transformed and interpreted as odds ratios:  the odds of solving an item correctly, given a 
condition, over the odds of solving the item given the reference condition, holding all other 
independent variables at fixed values.  Measures of model fit were estimated using likelihood 
ratio chi-square statistics (X2LR).  Definitions of the primary research question, along with three 
secondary research questions, may be found in Table 4. 




Study 1: Research Questions Expressed Through Contrast-Coded Variables for Statistical Analyses  
Primary condition Secondary condition ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 
RANDOMNESS 
APPROPRIATE 
Randomizing Devices C - - C 










R R R - 
Note: 'R' = reference group; 'C' = comparison group; '-' = not included in analysis 
Primary research question:     
ST1 Is performance on randomness appropriate items better than performance on 
randomness inappropriate items? 
Secondary research questions:     
ST2 Is performance on items in which the cover story depicts a social schema 
consistent with random assignment better than on items in which a 'first-come, first-
serve' (1C1S) schema is replaced with random assignement? 
ST3 Within the randomness inappropriate condition, does an explanation for why 1C1S 
is replaced with random assignment improve performance? 
ST4 Within the randomness appropriate condition, are probability items depicting 
randomizing devices easier to solve than items depicting social situations in which 
random assignment is expected? 
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Results 
Overall, 59.4% of participants correctly solved the problem.  Solution rates by condition 
are listed in Table 5.  Results by detailed region are presented in Table A2 in Appendix A.  
Four contrast-coded variables were used to test the primary research question and three 
secondary questions.  These questions and the groups compared with respect to each question 
are listed in Table 4.  Each research question (RQ) was expressed through a single degree-of-
freedom contrast-coded variable.  The primary RQ, as well as each secondary RQ, was tested 
separately in GZLM analyses both with and without covariate region.   
Results from GZLM analyses are summarized in Tables 6 through 9, including results 
from tests of model fit and parameter estimates for each predictor and covariate.  The primary 
research question (ST1) compared performance on randomness-appropriate (RA) items versus  
Table 5  
Study 1: Proportion Correct for Total and by Condition  
Primary condition Secondary condition n (%) correct all N 
RANDOMNESS 
APPROPRIATE Randomizing Devices 66 (66.7) 99 
 Social Schema Consistent 63 (63.6) 98 
RANDOMNESS 
INAPPROPRIATE 
Social Schema Inconsistent, with 
Explanation 53 (54.1) 99 
 Social Schema Inconsistent, without Explanation 52 (53.1) 98 
 TOTAL N 234 (59.4) 394 
randomness-inappropriate (RI) items (see Table 6).  In an ST1-only model, the model fit the data 
significantly better than an intercept-only model, X2LR (1, N = 394) = 5.70, p < .017.  The odds ratio 
for RA items versus RI items was 1.64 (p < .017). 
 The model including ST1 and the variables for region fit the data significantly better 
than the ST1-only model, X2LR (3, N = 394) = 25.39, p < .001.  Controlling for region effects, the 
odds ratio for the RA versus RI condition was 1.67 (p < .018).  Odds ratios for region, controlling 
Table 6 
Study 1: Results From Generalized Linear Model Analyses: Primary Research Question (N = 394)      




Model:  Randomness 
            5.70 1 .017 
ST1: Random appropriate versus 
Random inappropriate 1.64 0.50 5.70 1 .017    
Model:  Randomness with Covariates 
        25.39 3 .001 
ST1: Random appropriate versus 
Random inappropriate 1.67 0.51 5.56 1 .018    
Regionb 14.42 2 .001 
Asia versus English-speaking 0.45 -0.80 .004 
Europe and Latin America versus 
English-speaking 2.02 0.70   .068    
Model:  Covariate only 
        19.40   .001 
Region 19.40 .001 
Asia versus English-speaking 0.45 -0.80 .003 
Europe and Latin America versus 
English-speaking 2.66 0.98   .013    
                 
aOdds are calculated with respect to reference groups defined in Table 4
 bReference group = English-speaking countries
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for condition, were 0.45 (p < .004) for participants from Asia vs. English-speaking countries and 
2.02 (p < .068) for participants from the rest of the world relative to English-speaking countries.  
The effect of randomness as an expected or unexpected characteristic of the schema of a 
probability item’s cover story was statistically significant, controlling for regional differences.  
Analyses addressing the sensitivity of the effect of ST1 to region are presented in Appendix A. 
Tables 7 - 9 summarize results from GZLM analyses on the secondary research questions 
ST2 – ST4, respectively.  None of the tests related to the secondary research questions were 
significant with or without controlling for region effects.  
 
Table 7 
Study 1: Results From Generalized Linear Model Analyses: Additional Research Questions (N = 295) 




Model:  Social Schema Consistency 
          2.74 1 .098 
ST2: Social schema-consistent 
versus schema-inconsistent 1.52 0.042 2.74 1 .098    
Model:  Social Schema Consistency with Covariates 
            14.52 3 .002 
ST2: Social schema-consistent 
versus schema-inconsistent 1.53 0.43 2.74 1 .098    
Regionb 11.78 2 .003 
Asia versus English-speaking 0.39 -0.95 .003 
Europe and Latin America versus 
English-speaking 1.61 0.48   .261    
                  
aOdds are calculated with respect to reference groups defined in Table 4 




Study 1: Results From Generalized Linear Model Analyses: Additional Research Questions (N = 196) 




Model:  Explanation 
          0.02 1 .886 
ST3: Schema-inconsistent with explanation 
versus without explanation 1.04 0.12 0.02 1 .886    
Model:  Explanation with Covariates 
           12.22 3 .007 
ST3: Schema-inconsistent with explanation 
versus without explanation 1.00 0 0 1 .998    
Regionb 12.20 2 .002 
Asia versus English-speaking 0.27 -1.31 .001 
Europe and Latin America versus 
English-speaking 1.23 0.21   .663    
aOdds are calculated with respect to reference groups defined in Table 4
 bReference group = English-speaking countries
 
Table 9 
Study 1: Results From Generalized Linear Model Analyses: Additional Research Questions ( N = 198) 




Model:  Social Context 
        0.20 1 .655 
ST4: Random devices versus 
Social schema-consistent 1.14 0.13 0.20 1 .665    
Model:  Social Context with Covariates 
         15.79 3 .001 
ST4: Random devices versus 
Social schema-consistent 1.04 0.04 0.02 1 .902    
Regionb 15.59 2 .001 
Asia versus English-speaking 0.70 -0.36 .332 
Europe and Latin America versus 
English-speaking 13.53 2.61   .012    
aOdds are calculated with respect to reference groups defined in Table 4
 bReference group = English-speaking countries
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Discussion 
The effect of randomness as an expected or unexpected characteristic of the schema of a 
probability item’s cover story was statistically significant.  Participants receiving RA items were 
1.67 times more likely to solve the problem correctly than participants receiving RI items, 
accounting for regional differences.  Regional comparisons, controlling for condition, indicated 
that participants from Asia were less than half as likely as participants from English-speaking 
countries to solve the same type of item, while there was no significant difference between the 
likelihood of participants from the rest of the world and participants from English-speaking 
countries to solve the same type of problem.   
These results indicate that there is an added level of difficulty when solving a probability 
item in which the cover story depicts a situation contrived so that the expected order of events 
is replaced with random ordering.  With respect to social contracts (Cosmides, 1989), replacing 
1C1S order with random selection should have invoked an innate sensitivity to cheating and 
facilitated application of randomness.  The data in this study do not support this interpretation. 
Participants performed significantly better on items in which randomness was expected, 
lending support to Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) pragmatic schema theory.  Specifically, the line-
waiting, first-come first-served (1C1S) convention may be considered a deontic relation; in those 
terms, the 1C1S convention may be expressed as "If I arrive before you, then I will be served 
before you."  Removing this element increases the distance between the probability problem 
schema and the social schema.  This distance may further reduce the likelihood of schema 
induction, the process by which identifying an appropriate formal solution schema is affected by 
the strength of its association with the problem schema (Gick & Holyoak, 1980). 
   31 
 
Analyses on secondary research questions did not illustrate any significant differences.  
The first of these, ST2 (Table 7), indicated that there was no significant difference between 
performance on social-schema items with respect to whether randomness was appropriate or 
not to the schema.  The test on ST3 (Table 8) sought to reflect that within the RA condition, it 
was thought that performance on items depicting randomizing devices would be better than on 
items depicting social situations.  The data in Study 1 did not illustrate this phenomenon.  With 
respect to the RI secondary condition, ST4 (Table 9), the data did not indicate an effect of a 
randomness cue.  Based on previous studies, it was thought that including an explanation for the 
replacement of 1C1S ordering with random selection would make the stochasticity in the 
problem more apparent and improve performance on those items.  The Study 1 task required 
calculations and differed from those in which a randomness cue was shown to be effective, 
which required only qualitative interpretations of the phenomenon (Fong et al., 1986). 
For both RA and RI items, it may be that the relative computational simplicity of the 
formal problem structure did not provide opportunity to demonstrate some hypothesized 
effects.  With respect to the additional conditions within each set of RA and RI probability 
problems, participants were not asked to provide any interpretation of results.  It is possible 
that further contextual details, beyond whether or not randomness was appropriate, would have 
affected performance at a more nuanced level than the task demanded, as has been demonstrated 
by others (Fong, et al., 1993; Howell & Burnett, 1978; Schwartz & Goldman, 1996; Windschitl & 
Wells, 1998).  This may reflect the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processes.  Requiring 
calculation has been shown to induce Type 2 override, which may have obscured any meaningful 
distinction in perceived stochasticity between RA problems depicting objects and those 
depicting social situations as well as rendered the randomness cue in RI items unnecessary. 
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CHAPTER IV:  STUDY 2 
Statement of the Problem 
With respect to temporal and causal schemas, it is the convention to reason forwards, 
considering earlier events before those that happen later, and causes before effects, a preference 
which has been shown to affect the perception of the strength of a causal relationship (Cheng, et 
al., 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1980).  In addition, when given a choice, individuals prefer to 
wager on the outcomes of events that have yet to happen rather than unknown outcomes of past 
events (Brun & Teigen, 1990; Fischhoff, 1975, 1976; Rothbart & Snyder, 1970; Wright, 1982).  
Probability problems addressing conditional probability can be constructed using the same 
formal problem structure with respect to the likelihood of events in either anterograde or 
retrograde order.  Comparing the difficulty of problems differing in this respect, controlling for 
other factors, is a particularly apt way to address this issue.  It would be expected that both 
convention and preference for prediction over postdiction may affect problem difficulty with 
respect to the order of events as depicted in a problem schema.  Specifically, a problem asking 
for the likelihood of a cause given the likelihood of an effect would be more difficult than a 
problem asking for the likelihood of an effect given a cause.  A similar effect should also be found 
between earlier and later events.  In sum, inverting the direction of chronology of events should 
introduce an additional level of difficulty to a problem despite equivalent computations.   
The difficulty introduced by inverting the order of events may be affected by a common 
error with respect to conditional probability, termed the fallacy of the transposed conditional or the 
inverse fallacy, in which P(A|B) is expressed as P(B|A) (Bar-Hillel & Falk, 1982; Batanero, Henry, 
& Parzysz, 2005; Diaconis & Freedman, 1981; Díaz & Fuente, 2007; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 
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2007; Mackie, 1981; Neath, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1980; Villejoubert & Mandel, 2002).  
Among these discussions there has been speculation of conditions in which this fallacy is more 
or less likely to occur, but little evidence demonstrating the phenomenon systematically within 
judgment under uncertainty.  
In Study 2, items were constructed to test whether the order of events affects errors in 
expressing conditional probability, in turn making an item more difficult to solve.  Consider two 
events, A and B.  Given P(A), P(B), and P(A and B), it is possible to solve for either P(A|B) or 
P(B|A) using the same formula and calculations.  If in the cover story of the problem, A occurs 
before B or causes B, the conditional probability P(B|A) reflects a schema-consistent, intact order 
of events.  The conditional probability P(A|B), on the other hand, represents those events in an 
order inconsistent with a temporal schema.  The events are considered with respect to an 
inverted order: the conditional probability demands consideration of an event's occurrence in 
light of an event which is described as happening later.   
In Study 2 temporally-ordered events were depicted in probability problems with a 
cover story involving catching an express or local bus (Event A) and arriving on time to an 
appointment (Event B).  These problems required Bayes’s formula for a correct solution.  Causal 
events were depicted in problems with a cover story involving a physical state (cause) and a 
disease (effect).  Specifically, causal items involved the relationship between obesity (Event A) 
and Type 2 diabetes (Event B).  Causal problems involved calculating a conditional probability 
from joint and simple probabilities. 




Two cohorts participated in Study 2.  One cohort of participants (N = 19) was recruited 
from classes in probability and statistics from a graduate school in the social sciences.  They 
were paid $5 for their participation.   They were predominantly female, n = 13 (68.4%).  To 
contrast these participants with the cohort in Study 1, they were asked whether they were AMT 
workers.  All but four participants reported that they had never heard of AMT (79.0%). 
Another cohort of participants (N = 59) consisted of all students enrolled in two sections 
of an introductory probability and statistical inference course administered online during the 
Summer 2011 term. 
Materials 
Test items are listed in Table 10 by condition.  Each set of items is formally isomorphic, 
requiring the same mathematical solution. The pair of causal items contained the same 
information and required the application of the same formula.  Differences in the cover story 
between items are highlighted in the table here for clarity; test materials were not formatted 
thusly.  Order-intact (NT) items ask for a solution calculating the conditional probability of a 
later event (arriving on time) given an earlier event (catching an express bus) or the probability 
of an effect (having diabetes) given a cause (being obese).  Order-inverted (NV) items ask for a 
solution calculating the conditional probability of an earlier event (catching an express bus) 
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given a later event (arriving on time) or the probability of a cause (being obese) given an effect 
(having diabetes). 
Table 10 
Study 2: Test Items by Condition 
Temporal items 
Order Intact (forward direction) 
You are waiting to meet your friend.  He phones saying that he is getting on the next bus.  From 
experience you know that the probability that he arrives on time is 25%.  When he arrives on time, it is 90% 
likely that he took an express bus.  When he arrives late, it is 65% likely that he took an express bus.  He 
took an express bus.  What is the likelihood that he arrives on time? 
Order Inverted (backward direction) 
You are waiting to meet your friend.  He phones saying that he is getting on the next bus.  From 
experience you know that the probability of getting an express bus is 25%.  On an express bus, he is 90% 
likely to arrive on time.  On a local bus, he is 65% likely to be on time.  He arrived on time.  What is the 
likelihood that he took an express bus? 
Causal items 
Order Intact (forward direction) 
There is some evidence that obesity causes Type 2 diabetes.  About 25% of the United States 
adult population is obese.  8% of the US adult population have Type 2 diabetes.  5% of the population are 
obese and have Type 2 diabetes.  A randomly selected adult is obese.  What is the probability that this 
person has Type 2 diabetes? 
Order Inverted (backward direction) 
There is some evidence that obesity causes Type 2 diabetes.  About 25% of the United States 
adult population is obese.  8% of the US adult population have Type 2 diabetes.  5% of the population are 
obese and have Type 2 diabetes.  A randomly selected adult has Type 2 diabetes.  What is the probability 
that this person is obese? 
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Participants recruited in person received test items in a six-page packet in which they were 
provided with space to write out solutions.  An introductory page was followed by three pages 
with one probability item per page.  Questions were balanced so that each participant received 
one NT item and one NV item.  A “distractor” item from Study 1 was presented between the two 
Study 2 items.  The fifth page in the packet included demographic questions assessing age, race, 
gender, countries of education, and field of study.  The remainder of the page was allocated for 
comments.  The last page of the packet was a sheet of probability formulas (Figure A1). 
Participants in the online course were administered test items within a required five-
item quiz.  Quizzes were required periodically in this course and students had experience 
completing them in the online distance-learning environment. Each item was followed by a 
space into which the student was asked to type the solution as well as show work.  Examples of 
student work can be seen in Figures 3 and 4 on pages 44 - 45.  The temporal item was third and 
the causal item fifth in the quiz.  As with the in-person cohort, each student received one NT 
and one NV item.  
Procedure 
In-person volunteers 
Participants were recruited from statistics courses during the Spring and Summer 2011 
terms.  At the beginning of a class meeting, students were told that an experimenter would 
arrive ten minutes before the end of the class to recruit volunteers.  At the end of class, the 
experimenter described the general nature of the study, remuneration, and its purpose as 
dissertation research.  Volunteers remained after class, signed consent forms, and were given 
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test packets randomly.  There was no specific time limit, and students took between 15 and 25 
minutes on the task.  Participants submitted their packets individually when done, were paid, 
and thanked effusively.  Twelve students were willing to participate but unable to stay after 
class.  These students left their email addresses and were later contacted to schedule individual 
meetings.  Six of these students completed the task in the library and were similarly paid and 
thanked. 
Online students 
In the online courses, the quizzes with Study 2 items were posted in the course distance 
learning platform in June 2011.  Students in the online courses were given a period of 45 minutes 
to complete and submit the quiz.  Students received instructions to show work and were 
prohibited from collaborating.  These participants were required to enter supporting formulae 
for their answers; they did not enter an answer alone. 
A course teaching assistant (TA) copied each student’s quiz into a word document, 
removing all identifying information, which was provided to investigators.  Quizzes were graded 
for correct solution by both the TA and an investigator.  
 Analyses 
Variables of interest 
There were two dependent variables (DVs) for each item.  First, each solution was 
scored to indicate whether a student had solved for the correct mathematical answer, allowing 
for rounding error. 
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Second, written or typed work was coded to indicate whether a participant had formally 
symbolized conditional probability (CP) correctly.  Formalizing CP correctly is a necessary yet 
not sufficient condition in solving these test items and the most relevant step with respect to the 
experimental manipulation.  A student needed to express the relevant CP in the correct order 
either explicitly, e.g., “P(A|B) = .90”, or use the value of the CP in its appropriate position within 
a formula.  For example, if the student used the formula P(A|B) = P(A and B) / P(B), the values 
used must reflect the correct events.  If the problem text asked for P(A|B) but the student used 
values expressing P(A and B) / P(A), which equals P(B|A), the CP was coded as incorrect.  
In some written protocols it was possible to infer that a student correctly identified CP 
from a tree diagram (see Figure 2).  In the example in Figure 2, the structure of the tree indicates 
that the student is expressing the given CPs in the proper order, while numeric values given in 
the problem text are assigned to the correct branches.  In such cases CP was coded as correct.  
Figure 2 
Study 2: A Tree Diagram Drawn by a Participant in the Temporal Inverted Condition 
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A few participants did not show work on the items but reported a correct solution.  In 
these cases coding CP was scored as correct.  As previously stated, coding CP correctly is a 
necessary step in solving these items, so a correct answer implied that CP was coded in the 
correct order.  In written protocols showing work, there was only one case in which a student 
coded CP incorrectly and arrived at a correct answer.  Acknowledging that case as rare, it was 
considered reasonable to use this rule. 
The primary independent variable of interest was order of events, either NT or NV.  
Interrater reliability 
To estimate the interrater reliability (IRR) of the scheme coding both mathematical 
solution and formal expression of CP, a third of the online quizzes were coded by a second 
investigator with considerable experience with statistics instruction but not otherwise affiliated 
with the study.  Agreement was measured using Cohen’s kappa (k). 
Experimental analyses 
Proportion correct was calculated for each item for both in-person and online cohorts.  
Proportion correct on coding CP was also calculated for both cohorts.   
The procedure and samples for each of the two Study 2 cohorts were not similar enough 
to justify combining their data.  Binary logit GZLM analyses were performed on data from the 
online cohort only due to the small size of the in-person sample.  These analyses used the same 
methodology as described for Study 1 but with no covariates. 























A set of post-hoc analyses examined the frequency of several well-documented types of 
errors in probability problem solving.  Errors in formalizing CP were classified into one of three 
common types: transposed conditional, in which P(E1|E2) was expressed as P(E2| E1); compound 
substitution, in which P(E1 and E2) was mistaken for P(E1| E2), and simple substitution, in which 
P(E1) or P(E2) was substituted for P(E1| E2).  Previous research has shown that these are the most 
common errors in understanding conditional probability (Bar-Hillel & Falk, 1982; Falk, 1986; 
Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007; Mackie, 1981; Neath, 2010; Villejoubert & Mandel, 2002), 
although not all errors observed in the data could be classified into one of these categories.  
Figures 3 and 4 (pages 44 - 45) illustrate examples of CP expressions coded correctly and by 




Interrater reliability was measured using Cohen's kappa.  For temporal (bus) items 
agreement on solving the problem was k = .88, p < .001 and for coding CP, k = .79,  p < .001.  For 
causal (diabetes) items, IRR on correct solution was perfect, k = 1; IRR on coding CP was k = .89,  
p < .001.  Agreement was considered good to very good. 
   41 
 
Experimental analyses 
Proportion correct for both solution and expression of CP for each condition are 
summarized in Table 11 by cohort.  There were no significant differences between performance 




Study 2:  Performance on Items by Cohort and Condition 
In-Person (N = 19)        
Temporal order Intact Inverted Total 
n per group (%) 9 (47.4) 10 (52.6) 
Solving the problem n (%) correct 4 (33.3) 1 (10.0) 4 (21.0) 
Coding conditional probability n (%) correct 6 (66.7) 8 (80.0) 14 (73.7) 
Causal order Intact Inverted Total 
n per group (%) 9 (47.4) 10 (52.6) 
Solving the problem n (%) correct 4 (44.4) 4 (40.0) 8 (42.1) 
Coding conditional probability n (%) correct 4 (44.4) 5 (50.0) 9 (47.3) 
Online (N = 59)         
Temporal order Intact Inverted Total 
n per group (%) 31 (52.5) 28 (47.5) 
Solving the problem n (%) correct 5 (16.1) 7 (25.0) 12 (20.3) 
Coding conditional probability n (%) correct 16 (51.6) 24 (85.7) 40 (67.8) 
Causal order Intact Inverted Total 
n per group (%) 31 (52.5) 28 (47.5) 
Solving the problem n (%) correct 21 (67.7) 14 (50.0) 35 (59.3) 
Coding conditional probability n (%) correct 23 (74.2) 21 (75.0) 44 (74.6) 
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Results from binary logit GZLM analyses on the online data are summarized in Table 12.  
Of models testing the four DVs examined in Study 2, only the model estimating likelihood of 
formalizing CP for the temporal items fit the data significantly better than the intercept-only 
model, X2 LR (2, N = 59) = 8.24, p < .004.  The odds ratio for the effect of intact order relative to 
inverted order is 0.17 (p < .008). 
Error analyses 
Errors by cohort and condition are reported in Table 13.  There were no significant 
differences in the number of errors between conditions for either temporal or causal items for 
the in-person cohort.  For the online cohort, the group asked to solve for a CP in intact order 
produced more transposed conditional and compound substitution errors in expressing CP than 
the group asked to solve for CP in inverted order, but statistical tests were not significant.  The 
directionality of the results will be further addressed in the Discussion.  
Table 12 
Study 2: Results From Generalized Linear Model Analyses – Online Cohort Only 
   
N = 59 Oddsa B X2LR df p 
Temporal order 
Solving the problem 1.73 0.55 0.72 1 .401 
Coding conditional probability 5.62 1.73 8.24 1 .004 
Causal order 
Solving the problem 2.10 0.74 1.93 1 .165 
Coding conditional probability 0.96 -0.04 0.01 1 .943 
aReference group = inverted
Table 13
Study 2: Distribution of Prototypical Encoding Errors by Cohort and Condition
In-Person (N  = 19)
Temporal Items Intact Inverted Total Errors
n errors per condition (% error type) 2 (40.0) 3 (60.0) 5
Transposed Conditional 1 (50.0) 1 (33.3) 2 (40.0)
Compound Substitution 0 1 (33.3) 1 (20.0)
Simple Substitution 0 0 0
Unclassified 1 (50.0) 1 (33.3) 2 (40.0)
Causal Items Intact Inverted Total Errors
n errors per condition (% error type) 4 (44.4) 5 (55.6) 9
Transposed Conditional 1 (25.0) 3 (80.0) 5 (55.6)
Compound Substitution 3 (75.0) 1 (20.0) 4 (44.4)
Simple Substitution 0 0 0
Unclassified 0 0 0
Online (N  = 59)
Temporal Items Intact Inverted Total Errors
n errors per condition (% error type) 18 (85.7) 3 (14.7) 21
Transposed Conditional 5 (27.8) 0 5 (23.8)
Compound Substitution 6 (33.3) 0 6 (28.6)
Simple Substitution 1 (5.6) 1 (33.3) 2 (9.5)
Unclassified 6 (33.3) 2 (66.7) 8 (38.1)
Causal Items Intact Inverted Total Errors
n errors per condition (% error type) 7 (46.7) 8 (53.3) 15
Transposed Conditional 1 (14.3) 2 (25.0) 3 (20.0)
Compound Substitution 3 (42.9) 1 (12.5) 4 (26.7)
Simple Substitution 0 0 0
Unclassified 3 (42.9) 5 (62.5) 8 (53.3)
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Figure 3
Study 2: Solutions and Prototypical Errors to Temporal Items from Online Cohort.
Temporal item: intact order
You are waiting to meet your friend.  He phones saying that he is getting on the next bus.  The probability that he 
arrives on time is 25%.  When he arrives on time, it is 90% likely that he took an express bus.  When he arrives 
late, it is 65% likely that he took an express bus.  He took an express bus.  What is the likelihood (probability) that 
he arrives on time?
Correct solution
P(Express) = P(OT and Express) + P(Late and Express)
=(.25)(.90) + (.75)(.65) = .225 + .4875
= .7125 is probability of taking an express bus
So P(OT|Express) = P(OT and Express) / P(Express)
0.315789474
= . 316 is the probability that he is on time given he took an express bus.
Transposed Conditional and Simple Substitution Errors
P(OT) = .25  P(L) = .75
P(OT/EX) = .90 [Should be P(EX|OT) ]
P(L/EX) = .65  [Should be P(EX|L )]
P(OT) = ?
P(OT n EX) = P(OT)P(OT/EX) = (.25)(.90) = .225
P(L n EX) = P(L)P(L/EX) = (.75)(.65) = .4875
P (OT) = late/not late and also express bus = .4875 + .225 = .7125  [Has solved for P(E )]
Temporal item: inverse order
You are waiting to meet your friend.  He phones saying that he is getting on the next bus.  The probability of 
getting an express bus is 25%.  On an express bus, he is 90% likely to arrive on time.  On a local bus, he is 65% 
likely to be on time.  He arrives on time.  What is the likelihood (probability) that he took an express bus? 
Correct solution
Let E = Express Bus Let OT = On time Let L = Local Bus
Using Bayes Rule:
P(E|OT) = P(OT|E)*p(E) / P(OT)
P(OT) = P(OT and E) + P(OT and L)
P(OT) = P(OT|E)p(E) + P(OT|L)*p(L)
P(OT) = (.9)*(.25) + (.65)*(.75) = .7125
So  (.9)*(.25) / (.7125) = .3158
Simple Substitution Error
The probability of being on time when taking express: (0.25)(0.9)=0.225, and the probability of being on time 
when taking local: (0.75)(0.65)=0.4875. When adding all these probabilities, the likelihood of being on time is 
(0.225)+(0.4875)=0.7125.
Hence, the probability of taking express bus is 71.25%  [Student solved for P(E )]
Compound Substitution Error
Probability of express bus (A) given arrival on time (B).   
P(A^B)=P(A and B)/P(B)
P(A^B)=P(.90)/P(.25)
P(A^B)=                 [Student assigned value of P(B|A) to P(A and B) ]
Note: Explanatory comments are in brackets
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Figure 4
Study 2: Solutions and Prototypical Errors to Causal Items from Online Cohort
Causal item: intact order
There is some evidence that obesity causes Type 2 diabetes.  About 25% of the United States adult 
population is obese.  8% of the US adult population have Type 2 diabetes.  5% of the population are 
obese and have Type 2 diabetes.  A randomly selected adult is obese.  What the probability that this 





Also it is given that:
P(O and 2D)=0.05.
Then, P(2D, given O)=P(O and 2D)/P(O)=0.05/0.25=0.2
Transposed Conditional Error
0.5/0.8=0.625 [P(O and D)/P(D) = P(O|D), rather than P(D|O )]
Compound Substitution Error
0.25 * 0.05 = 0.0125  [P(O)P(D|O) = P(O and D) ]
Causal item: inverse order
There is some evidence that obesity causes Type 2 diabetes.  About 25% of the United States adult 
population is obese.  8% of the US adult population have Type 2 diabetes.  5% of the population are 
obese and have Type 2 diabetes.  A randomly selected adult has Type 2 diabetes.  What the 




P(O^Type2) = .05 = P(O|Type2)*P(Type2)
P(O|Type2) = .05/.08 = .625
Transposed Conditional Error
let P(OB) = the probability that someone is obese = 25%
P(T2)= the probability that someone has type 2 = 8%
P(OB and T2)= 5%
P(T2 | OB ) = P (T2 and OB)/ P (OB)
P(T2|OB)   = 5% /25%
            = .2  [Should have solved for P(OB|T2) ]
Compound Substitution Error
5%   [5% is given as P(Obese and T2 Diabetes) ]
2D', 'T2', and 'D' = 'having diabetes'.  'O' and 'OB' = 'obese'.
Note: Explanatory comments are in brackets
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Discussion 
Order impacted the likelihood of formalizing conditional probability for the temporal 
items but not causal items.  No significant differences were found in the likelihood of solving 
test items with cover stories depicting events of intact or inverted order for both causal and 
temporal items.   
The proportion of students solving the items correctly was too low for meaningful 
analyses comparing solution on the temporal items specifically.  Application of Bayes’s rule is on 
the more difficult end of the spectrum of skills required to solve introductory probability 
problems (Bar-Hillel & Falk, 1982; Díaz & Fuente, 2007) and may have produced a floor effect, 
preventing the data from varying enough for analysis.   
Results for Study 2, where significant, were not as originally expected.  It was believed 
that a test item requiring a solution in which the temporal order of events is inverted would be 
more difficult than an item with events in intact temporal order.  Analyses indicated that the 
odds ratio for correctly formalizing CP on an intact-order item versus an inverted-order item is 
0.087.  This result indicates that an individual is 0.1 times as likely to formalize CP correctly for 
an intact-order item than for an inverted item.  In other words, the inverted-order items are 11.5 
times as likely than intact-order items to have CP expressed correctly.  
Although they were not included in GZLM analyses, examination of written protocols 
was useful to explain the direction of this result.  The conditional probability expressed in the 
last line of the problem text is only one of three conditional probabilities defined in the temporal 
items, the other two being given.  For items asking for a solution of the CP of intact-order 
events, the given CPs reflect inverted-order events.  “Inverted-order” items, on the other hand, 
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included given CPs reflecting events in intact order.  Since when solving any word problem an 
individual must translate the text of the problem into formal mathematical notation, the 
direction of given CPs may be of greater relevance to performance on the item than the direction 
of the CP to be solved (Pólya, 1954a, 2004).   
Examining written protocols of the 19 in-person participants also revealed that nine 
subjects sketched a table or tree; two in the NV condition (in which the CPs given were intact) 
and seven in the NT condition (given CPs depicted events in inverted order).  So, perhaps the 
increased difficulty of encoding events in inverted order encouraged participants to use 
graphical devices (see Zahner & Corter, 2010).  Further, of the participants using graphical 
devices to encode the CP events in inverted order, five used trees and two used contingency 
tables.  All but one encoded CP correctly; this participant used a table, which has been shown to 
obscure rather than facilitate working with CP (Díaz & Fuente, 2007; Gras & Totohasina, 
1995). 
These results indicated that, to investigate the effect of temporal order on a problem's 
difficulty, Study 2 hypotheses must be revised and the conditions of the study revisited with 
items classified according to the direction of given CPs rather than the direction of the CP to be 
solved.  Significant reworking of items was required to examine the effect of order as expressed 
in our revised hypothesis as well as to more appropriately reflect the abilities of novice statistics 
students. 
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CHAPTER V: STUDY 3 
Statement of the Problem  
The proportion of students correctly identifying the temporal and causal items in Study 
2 as asking to solve for a conditional was startlingly low.  To control for this, all items were 
revised to make conditional probability within the problems more salient.  Further, examining 
problem-solving procedures from Study 2 indicated that the order of given conditional 
probabilities (CP), rather than the direction of CPs to be solved, was more relevant.  This is the 
case in items asking to solve for temporal or causal order intact.  We expect that for these 
revised items it would be more difficult to encode CP when given CPs are expressed with order 
intact than when expressed with order inverted. 
Two further issues arose from Study 2.  The difficulty that novice statistics students have 
in solving problems requiring Bayes’s rule introduced challenges outside of the scope of this 
research and may have obscured order effects.  The pair of temporal problems for Study 3 used 
the same cover story as those in Study 2, and was edited so that participants were still required 
to encode CP, but solve for the probability of a simple event.  Bayes’s rule was not required for 
correct solution.  The other issue encountered in Study 2 concerned the relative perceived 
strength of the causal relationship between the events depicted in the cover story for the causal 
problems in Study 2, as has been shown to affect problem solving (Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1980; Windschitl & Wells, 1998).  Specifically, it was thought that the 
causal relationship between obesity and Type 2 diabetes may not have enough schematic 
salience to induce order effects.  For Study 3, cover stories were constructed to depict events 
with greater perceived causal strength to the population of interest, novice students of 
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probability and statistics.  The cover stories for causal items in Study 3 depicted the events of 
studying for an exam and passing the exam.  These items asked participants to calculate a 
conditional probability given probabilities for joint and compound events.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were all students enrolled in one of four introductory courses in probability 
and statistical inference during the Fall 2011 term at a graduate school of social sciences.  Two 
instructors taught these courses; there were 54 students in one instructor’s sections and 69 
students in the other’s.  All four sections were taught in person. 
Materials 
Test items were presented to students as part of an in-class quiz.  For one instructor’s 
quizzes, the temporal item was presented first and the causal item third on a three-item quiz.  
The three items were presented on a single sheet of paper.  In the other instructor's sections, the 
temporal item was presented fourth and the causal item second in a four-item quiz.   Each item 
on this quiz was presented on a separate sheet of paper.  Table 14 includes the test items by 
condition, with differences between pairs of items highlighted for clarity here only.  Items 
presented to students were not formatted as such. 
Table 14 
Study 3: Test Items by Condition 
TEMPORAL ITEMS 
Order Intact (forward direction) 
You are waiting to meet your friend, who is coming from work.   He phones saying he will get on the 
next bus. From experience you know that if he catches an express bus his chances of being on time 
are 90%, but if he catches a local bus his chances of being on time are 65%.  You also know that 
60% of the buses that stop by his work are locals, thus he has a 60% chance of catching a local bus 
today.  What is the probability that he arrives on time? 
Order Inverted (backward direction) 
You are waiting to meet your friend, who is coming from work.  He phones saying he will get on the 
next bus.  From experience you know that when he arrives on time, 90% of the time he has caught 
an express bus, but when he arrives late, 65% of the time he has caught an express bus. You also 
know from experience that he is late 60% of the time, thus you figure that he has a 60% chance of 
being late today.  What is the probability that he catches an express bus? 
CAUSAL ITEMS 
Order Intact (forward direction) 
At a journalism school, a professional ethics exam is given to all students at the end of their first year. 
Extensive research has established that the probability that a student studies specifically for this 
exam is 70%.  The overall proportion of students who pass the exam is 92%.   Exactly 66% of the 
students will study for the exam and pass it.  If we know that a student has studied specifically for the 
exam, what is the probability that the student FAILS? 
Order Inverted (backward direction) 
At a journalism school, a professional ethics exam is given to all students at the end of their first year. 
Extensive research has established that the probability that a student studies specifically for this 
exam is 70%.  The overall proportion of students who pass the exam is 92%.   Exactly 66% of the 
students will study for the exam and pass it. If we know that a student has passed the exam, what is 
the probability that the student DID NOT study specifically for it? 
50
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Procedure 
Both instructors gave the quizzes during the fourth week of the course, after covering the 
topic of conditional probability.  Quizzes were administered during the last 30 minutes of each 
one hour, 40 minute session.  Students were permitted to use notes and a calculator. 
Course TAs scanned completed quizzes into files, removing all identifying information.  
There was variation by course TA in grading the quizzes so all items were scored and coded by 
an investigator.  A subset of approximately 30% of participants' data was also coded by the same 
independent rater as in Study 2, using the same interrater reliability procedures. 
Analyses 
Variables of interest 
The dependent variables (DV) of interest are the same as in Study 2, using the same 
coding criteria.  Each item was scored to indicate whether a student had come to the correct 
mathematical solution and whether the student had encoded conditional probability correctly. 
The primary independent variable (IV) of interest is order of given events, intact-order 
(NT) or inverted-order (NV).  Instructor was also included as a covariate, since items were 
presented differently on each quiz and the two instructors differed significantly in years of 
teaching experience. 
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Interrater reliability 
Interrater reliability was calculated using Cohen’s kappa (k) for both problem solution 
and encoding CP. 
Experimental analyses 
Proportion of correct solution and encoding CP was calculated and are reported in Table 
15.  No statistical tests were applied to these simple proportions. 
Binary logit generalized linear model analyses (GZLM) were performed to yield 
statistical tests of both overall model fit as well as parameter estimates for order effects, 
controlling for instructor.  These analyses used the same methodology as described for Studies 1 
and 2. 
Error analyses 
Errors in formally expressing CP were further coded into one of the common types of 
mistakes defined for Study 2.  The items for Study 3 required different calculations than Study 2, 
so it was not expected that the same types of errors would necessarily be represented in these 
data.  
Errors by condition were analyzed using GZLM, with one exception discussed below.  
Analyses were used to compare likelihood of making each type of error, controlling for 
instructor.  Statistical analyses on common error types included only the subset of participants 
who coded CP incorrectly.   




Interrater reliability was acceptable for each DV in each set of items.  For problem 
solution in temporal items, kappa = 1.00 (p < .001); for encoding CP, kappa = .56 (p < .005).  For 
causal items, agreement in coding problem solution is k = 1.00 (p < .001); agreement in coding CP 
correct is k = .49 (p < .012).   
Experimental analyses 
Proportion correct by condition is summarized in Table 15.  Overall, more participants 
coded CP correctly for each item type than solved the item correctly.  Correlations among the 
two DVs for both types of item are included in Appendix C.  
 
Table 15 
Study 3:  Performance on Items by Condition     
Temporal items Intact Inverted Total 
n per condition (% correct) 55 (44.7) 68 (55.3) 123 
Solving the problem 32 (58.2) 35 (52.5) 67 (54.5) 
Coding conditional probability 41 (74.5) 39 (57.4) 80 (65.0) 
       
Causal items Intact Inverted Total 
n per condition (% correct) 67 (54.9) 55 (45.1) 122 
Solving the problem 17 (25.4) 11 (20.0) 28 (23.0) 
Coding conditional probability 43 (64.2) 19 (34.5) 62 (50.8) 
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Results from generalized linear model analyses are summarized in Table 16.   There were 
no significant differences between groups in proportion solving temporal or causal items 
correctly.  For temporal items, the model using  order and instructor to predict formalizing CP 
correctly fit significantly better than an intercept-only model, X2 LR (2, N = 123) = 9.16, p < .010.  
Controlling for instructor effect, temporal order significantly predicted coding CP correctly, X2 
LR (1, N = 123) = 6.02, p < .014.  Parameter estimates indicated that the odds of formalizing CP for 
order intact relative to order inverted is 2.67 (p < .017).  The effect of instructor was not 
significant controlling for temporal order.  
Table 16 
Study 3:  Results From Generalized Linear Model Analyses 
Temporal items                 
N = 123 Oddsa B X2LR df p 
Model   
X2LR df p 
DV = Solving the problem           7.47 2 .126 
Temporal Order 1.31 0.27 0.52 1 .472 
Instructor 0.48 -0.74 3.93 1 .048 
DV = Coding conditional probability          9.16 2 .010 
Temporal Order 2.66 0.98 6.02 1 .014 
Instructor 2.31 0.84 4.47 1 .034 
                
Causal items 
N = 122 Odds B X2LR df p 
Model   
X2LR df p 
DV = Solving the problem          5.65 2 .059 
Causal Order 1.63 0.49 1.21 1 .272 
Instructor 2.45 0.89 3.90 1 .048 
DV = Coding conditional probability          17.08 2 .001 
Causal Order 3.70 1.31 11.71 1 .001 
Instructor 2.17 0.78 3.98 1 .046 
 aReference group = inverted 
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For causal items, the model including order and instructor predict expressing CP 
correctly also fit significantly better than an intercept-only model, X2 LR (2, N = 122) = 17.08,  p < 
.001.  Controlling for instructor effect, causal order significantly predicted coding CP correctly, 
X2 LR (1, N = 122) =11.71,  p < .001.  The odds of expressing CP correctly for order intact items is 3.70 
(p < .001) relative to order inverted items.  Controlling for causal order, the effect of instructor 
was not significant.  
Error analyses 
Types of errors by condition are summarized in Table 17.  Simple probability substitution 
for conditional errors did not occur in Study 3, most likely since the problems were redesigned 
to require different calculation procedures.  Statistical tests were conducted on observations 
with incorrect CP encoding only.  
Table 17 
Study 3: Distribution of Prototypical Encoding Errors by Condition 
Temporal Items Intact Inverted Total Errors 
n errors per condition ( error type) 14 (32.6) 29 (67.4) 43 (35.0) 
Transposed Conditional 0 (0) 15 (51.7) 15 (34.9) 
Compound Substitution 1 (7.1)) 2 (6.9) 3 (7.0) 
Unclassified 13 (92.9) 12 (41.4) 25 (58.1) 
       
Causal Items Intact Inverted Total Errors 
n errors per condition ( error type) 23 (39.7) 35 (60.3) 58 (49.2) 
Transposed Conditional 2 (8.7) 11 (31.4) 13 (22.4) 
Compound Substitution 14 (60.9) 9 (25.7) 23 (39.7) 
Unclassified 7 (30.4) 15 (42.9) 22 (37.9) 
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No participants in the NT condition made the transposed conditional errors.  GZLM 
could not be used to analyze these data as zero-cells yield complete separation in the data and 
unreliable estimates.  Statistical significance of a chi-square test was therefore evaluated using 
Fisher's exact test, X2 (1, N = 43) = 11.12, p < .001. 
Analyses on transposed conditional errors in causal items controlled for effect of 
instructor using GZLM.  Although more transposed conditionals occurred in the causal inverted 
group, the difference was significant only at the p < .10 level, X2 LR (1 , N = 58) = 4.81, p < .057 .  
Students in the NT condition were significantly more likely to commit joint substitution errors, 
X2 LR (1 , N = 58) = 6.66, p < .010, with an odds ratio of 4.3.  Figures 5 and 6 include examples of 
transposed conditional errors for both temporal and causal items. 
Figure 5 
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Discussion 
The rationale behind Study 3 was to demonstrate the effects of temporal and causal order 
on encoding conditional probability.  Revising the hypotheses from Study 2 highlighted that 
order affected encoding CPs which were given in a probability problem, rather than the order of 
the CP to solve. 
Temporal order significantly affected encoding CP.  The odds ratio for encoding CP 
correctly in temporal items was 2.66, indicating that, controlling for instructor, a student 
receiving an NT item was 2.66 times as likely to encode conditional probability correctly than a 
student receiving an NV item.  Further, of students who did not encode CP correctly for 
temporal items, only students receiving NV items transposed the order of events.  Order effects 
were also demonstrated in the causal items.   
Participants were more than three times as likely to encode CP correctly for NT items 
than for NV items, controlling for instructor.  Error analyses using GZLM indicated that a  
Figure 6 
Study 3: Example of Reverse Error in Causal Inverse Item 
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 marginally significant proportion of students made the transposed conditional error in the NV 
condition, controlling for instructor.    
 The results from these error analyses indicate that there may be schema-specific effects 
related to temporal and causal order.  Recall that that the likelihood of committing a compound 
probability error in causal items was significantly more likely in the NT condition.  Since types 
of errors coded were mutually exclusive, it makes sense that in absence of making a transposed 
conditional error, students erring in encoding CP may be more likely to make another systematic 
error.  Compound substitution errors are fairly common when interpreting conditional 
probability, and these data do not necessarily indicate that mistaking compound for conditional 
probability is specifically affected by temporal or causal order.  In other words, error analyses 
may demonstrate that transposed conditional errors are sensitive to order effect, while 
compound probability errors are not specific to order effect.   
Study 3 findings support a phenomenon demonstrated by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1980).  It was shown that, in cases in which P(A) = P(B), and P(A|B) = P(B|A), individuals were 
more likely to judge P(B|A) as greater than P(A|B) if they believed that A was a cause of B.  The 
results of Study 3 demonstrated that, possibly as a result of the strength of causal direction, 
students exhibited a preference for expressing conditional probability preserving forward 
direction of cause to effect that was not demonstrated with respect to the events depicted in the 
Study 2 items. 
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 CHAPTER VI:  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Summary 
Results from the three studies described in this paper support the idea that there are 
differential schematic effects on probability problem solving.  Probability problems were 
written with cover stories depicting objects (e.g., randomizing devices) as well as social 
situations, keeping the formal problem structure and solution processes consistent between 
conditions.  Systematically altering the schema depicted in a probability problem's cover story 
was shown to affect the difficulty of the item as well as the type of errors.  This effect was 
demonstrated with respect to social schemas (Study 1) as well as temporal and causal schemas 
(Studies 2 and 3) for a variety of participants.   
Specifically, Study 1 illustrated that when randomness is unexpected in a social schema, 
individuals were less likely to correctly solve a probability problem relative to problems in 
which randomness was appropriate to the schema depicted.  An individual was more than one-
and-a-half times as likely to correctly solve a problem in which randomness was appropriate to 
the problem schema.  Our results did not support that it would be easier to solve a randomness-
appropriate item if it depicted objects rather than people in a lottery-type situation.  For 
situations in which random ordering was not appropriate, having an explanation for imposing 
randomness did not affect formal probability calculations. 
Schematic effects were also shown with respect to temporal and causal direction in 
Studies 2 and 3.  Results from Study 2 specified that, in solving problems requiring Bayes's 
formula, difficulty in encoding conditional probability affected an item's difficulty with respect 
to the given CPs, rather than the direction of the CP to be solved.  The difficulty that novice 
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statistics students have in applying Bayes's formula was also supported in the data by the 
scarcity of correct solutions. 
Study 3 was designed to revisit the hypotheses addressed in Study 2, with refinements to 
isolate schematic order effects.  It was shown that for both temporally- and causally-related 
events, participants were more likely to encode given conditional probabilities incorrectly when 
the events are expressed in inverse order.  In addition, those errors were more likely to transpose 
the events from inverse order to intact order than from intact to inverse order.  For problems 
depicting causally-related events, participants were also more likely to incorrectly encode CP 
when solving for CP expressing events in inverse order. 
This finding may be considered in light of the phenomenon of the fallacy of the time axis, as 
illustrated by Falk (1986).  In a within-subjects study, participants were asked to consider the 
events of drawing two marbles from an urn containing two black and two white marbles.  Asked 
first to evaluate the probability of drawing a second white marble after having drawn a first 
white marble without replacement, P(W2|W1), most participants provide the correct answer 
with relative ease.  Next, asking the same participants to consider P(W1|W2), a significant 
proportion of participants reply that the question is meaningless.  Of those who attempt to solve 
the problem, many indicate that the probability is 1.00 or incorrectly solve the item without 
considering the probability of the conditioning event.  A similar phenomenon was also observed 
in the data from Studies 2 and 3, in that only participants asked to evaluate and solve for CP in 
inverted order answered the problem with extreme values of 1.00 or the given simple 
probability.  For example, given event A which precedes event B, when asked the likelihood of A 
given B, only students in the inverted-order condition answered P(A) rather than P(A|B).  In 
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Study 2, one participant in the temporal-item NV condition reasoned that "P(E) = 1 because you 
know he took an express bus". 
Although the results from Studies 2 and 3 parallel Falk's (1986), only the current studies 
illustrated that the fallacy persists when encoding formal CP, typically considered a Type 2 
process.  There has been little evidence or explanation of relevant processes influencing the 
occurrence of the fallacy of the transposed conditional.  Villejoubert and Mandel (2002) 
illustrated that while frequency formats reduced the number of transposed conditional errors, 
their only explanation offered is that "people simply confuse p(H|D) with p(D|H) because the 
latter sounds a lot like the former" (their emphasis).   
Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) speculated that transposed conditionals are more likely 
when P(A|B) is estimated as roughly equivalent to P(B|A), as defined by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1980).  Krynski and Tenenbaum's interpretation overgeneralizes the Tversky and Kahneman 
finding; neither the 1980 data nor the present findings support that the transposed conditional 
occurs specifically in cases when P(A|B) and P(B|A) are roughly equivalent, but rather persists 
despite the two CPs being defined as equivalent.  Results from Study 3 further illustrated that 
participants exhibited a significant bias in transposing CP to forward causal or temporal 
direction when those events in a problem were depicted in inverse temporal or causal order, but 
rarely from intact to inverse order. 
Limitations 
The current research was undertaken to examine schematic effects on probability 
problem solving in a general population, but with particular emphasis on training social 
scientists expected to produce and consume research.  The pool of participants for Study 1 was 
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different from the participants in Studies 2 and 3 in a number of ways worth noting.  
Information about Study 1's participants' fields of study or profession was collected with other 
demographic items.  No differences were shown affecting performance or assigned condition 
among groups defined by academic field, so it was not included in analyses.  In addition, almost 
80% of in-person volunteers for Study 2 indicated that they had never heard of the online 
platform used to recruit Study 1 participants.  Anecdotal evidence may inform that volunteers on 
an online testing platform have more experience in technical fields and, by extension, more 
experience with training in mathematics and statistics.  These participants also exhibited 
differential effects depending on the countries in which they were educated, although the 
variable used to group them by region did not specifically assess English proficiency and should 
not be interpreted as such. 
The experimental data collected for all three studies were limited to performance on a 
numeric calculation; participants were not required to provide any interpretation of results or 
put their numeric answers in the problem context.  This may have been where additional 
schematic effects would have been demonstrated.  Further study into the additional conditions 
for Study 1 will likely require more complicated problems to illustrate the more nuanced effects 
typically attributed to Type 1 processes.   
Analyses on problem-solving processes were possible to a degree on data collected for 
Studies 2 and 3 since the data included written protocols, but these were unavailable for about 
ten participants who used separate materials on which to work.  Most of these participants 
produced correct solutions to the problems, but error analyses were not possible for the few 
who did not.  Further, in those cases it was not possible to examine written work to inform 
whether their solutions included a tree or other graphical representation of the problem. 
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Implications 
How do schematic effects of probability problem solving inform processes by which 
individuals make valid statistical inferences about human behavior?  Allowing for the limitations 
of the studies presented in this paper, it is still apparent that stochastic influence on human 
behavior is not easily conceptualized.  People more readily attribute outcomes to unobserved or 
unknown variables rather than stochasticity in most situations (Luhmann & Ahn, 2005).  When 
a problem's situational or schematic content refers to human behavior, variation is regularly 
attributed to human intent (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cheng, et al., 1993; Falk & Lann, 2008; 
Fong, et al., 1993; Nisbett, et al., 1993; Schwartz & Goldman, 1996).   
Krynski & Tenenbaum (2007) showed improved performance on probability problems 
when the conditions assumed in conditional probabilities function as causal roles or explanations 
over those problems in which conditions are presented with no explanatory role.  For example, 
the temporal items from Studies 2 and 3 might include an explanation that the friend is unlikely 
to catch an express bus because they are typically overcrowded.  The friend's preference for local 
buses may then account for his 75% overall likelihood to arrive late.  Such details have been 
shown to highlight problem elements which may otherwise be overlooked.   In statistics 
instruction in the social sciences, providing explanatory roles for conditions affecting stochastic 
human behavior may improve both performance on a problem as well as its interpretability for 
students.   
Parsing how conditional probability is interpreted may inform a source of bias produced 
by the order of events depicted in probability problems.  If, in the cover story of a problem, event 
A occurs before event B or causes event B, the conditional probability P(B|A) reflects a schema-
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consistent, intact order of events, translated as “the probability that B occurs given that A has 
occurred,” reflecting a deterministic, forward-looking time perspective.  In contrast, translating 
P(A|B) as “the probability that A occurs given that B has occurred” is nonsensical given the 
problem script.  Representing P(A|B) demands consideration of events in inverted chronological 
order and may be validly translated as only “the probability that A has occurred given that B has 
occurred,” with retrospective time perspective.   
These two representations of conditional probability reflect two different types of 
reasoning about uncertainty (Hacking, 1975; Fox & Ülkümen, 2011).  While P(B|A) may be 
addressed in the predictive, aleatory sense, P(A|B) must be considered with epistemic evaluation 
postdictively.   
Reasoning from signs to sources has an extensive history distinct from deductive 
reasoning from causes to effects.  The historical and philosophical contexts of reasoning about 
an event's likelihood versus estimating one's confidence in an assertion has been thoroughly 
discussed as the aleatory-epistemic distinction by Hacking (1975), but the dichotomy has also been 
explicitly addressed as probable-plausible with respect to mathematical induction (Pólya, 1941, 
1954b), predictive-diagnostic in the heuristics and biases debate (Cohen, 1981; Mackie, 1981), as 
well as objective-subjective in literature on decision making (Fox & Ülkümen, 2011).   
Schematic effects on probability problem solving may inform instruction on statistical 
inference by reflecting on how the two dimensions of probability judgments are theoretically 
distinct.  Evidence from Study 3 supports an interpretation which addresses this difference in 
reasoning as parallel to the process of statistical inference and has implications for statistical 
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education.  In evaluating evidence from a sample, the process of hypothesis testing requires 
considering the conditional probability of finding a result in light of the null hypothesis H0, a 
preexisting fact in the world, which in fact either is, P(H0) = 1, or is not, P(H0) = 0.  So while 
results from Studies 2 and 3 indicate that it is easier to conceptualize P( some observed phenomenon | 
H0), hypothesis testing evaluates P(H0 | some observed phenomenon).  In addition, in evaluating the 
validity of statistical inferences, students are taught to consider the likelihood of Type I and Type 
II errors, terms which have become shorthand for particular conditional probabilities.  The 
convention in statistics education of not representing Type I and Type II errors as explicitly 
conditional probabilities has been criticized for oversimplifying students' concept of statistical 
inference and leads to inappropriate levels of confidence in results (Neath, 2010).  Training in 
statistical inference demands a level of mastery of understanding CP in inverted order, which is 
inconsistent with causal schemas and may warrant more classroom discussion with respect to 
the nuances and implications for hypothesis testing. 
In the case of social scientific research, quantitative evidence supporting claims about 
human behavior relies on the convention of hypothesis testing, which requires a degree of 
sophistication in understanding probability and likelihood.  Judgments about social phenomena 
are mediated by the interaction of how one interprets human behavior through personal 
experience while accounting for patterns which may not be apparent except in aggregate.  The 
combination of the salience of personal experience with the relative opacity of statistical 
inference regularly leads to discounting or misinterpreting empirical evidence when making 
high-stakes educational or policy decisions (Epstein, 1986; Milton, 2006; Paris & Luo, 2010; 
Slavin, 2004). 
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Heuristics and biases in evaluating quantitative information, including those addressed 
in this paper, have been shown in both laypeople as well as persist in individuals with extensive 
graduate training in probability and statistics.  Conditions and assumptions which are relevant 
in applying statistical analyses to human behavior are regularly violated or overlooked, in part, 
by these biases, and impede nuanced evaluation of empirical results.  Statistical training may 
explicitly address the demonstrated schematic effects, so that social scientists' are better able to 
contextualize statistical evidence having real-world consequence.  
Future Directions 
Further investigation into schematic effects on probability problem solving will 
incorporate additional conditions which have been demonstrated in the literature.  The robust 
effects facilitating problem-solving success when probabilities are expressed in frequency 
formats (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, 2007; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007) would be expected 
to affect problem solving on the items designed for this paper.  The salience of a causal 
relationship was shown to possibly mediate order effects with respect to coding conditional 
probability in Studies 2 and 3, and variants of causal items in future studies will be written to 
address this factor more explicitly, in the model of Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007). 
Interview data may contribute particularly relevant details about the probability 
problem-solving process.  A few sessions with students instructed to "think aloud" while solving 
problems may add to a future research program.  Analyses on interview data should inform 
critical points as sources of common misconceptions and biases in problem-solving 
performance. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1: Study 1 Participants' Self-Reported Countries of Education 
One of the demographic items asked in which country or countries participants were 
educated.  Each participant was assigned to one of three following categories for the variable 
Region based on the response to this question. 
Table A1 
Study 1: Region Codes by  Participants’ Self-Reported Countries of Education 
Region N Countries of Educationa 
English-speaking countries 275 United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, 
Jamaica, and New Zealand 
Asia 73 India, Singapore, Bahrain, China, Japan, Iran, Mongolia, Nepal,  
Pakistan, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Thailand  
Europe, Latin America,   
Non-English-speaking 
countries 
46 Spain, Chile, France, Romania, Russia, Austria, Brazil, Germany, 
Serbia, Ukraine, Venezuela, Bosnia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Costa Rica,  
Croatia,  Czech Republic, Greece, Israel, Italy, Macedonia, Mexico, 
Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands 
aCountries listed in order of most to least frequent
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Figure A1:  Probability Formulas Provided to Participants 
 
Table A2:  Detailed Regional Outcomes and descriptives 
 
Table A3: Sensitivity Analysis 
Table A3 
 
Study 1: Sensitivity Analyses Using Generalized Linear Models: Effect by Region 
ST1: Random appropriate versus Random inappropriate    
N Odds B X2LR df p 
Region 
Asia 73 3.06 1.12 5.28 1 .022 
Europe and Latin America 46 13.14 2.58 8.32 1 .004 
English-speaking Countries 275 1.19 0.17 0.48 1 .489 
              
 
Table A2  




Time on task 
(minutes) 
Age   
(years) 
 N (% total) N (% region) M (SD) M (SD) 
United States 248 (62.9) 151 (60.9) 3.28 (2.3) 29.1 (9.9) 
India 58 (14.7) 20 (34.5) 3.56 (2.7) 26.9 (6.6) 
Europe, not English-speaking 36 (9.1) 28 (77.8) 4.84 (2.5) 30.2 (9.2) 
English-speaking countries outside North Americaa 17 (4.3) 11 (64.7) 3.35 (2.2) 25.2 (5.3) 
Asia, not India 14 (3.6) 9 (64.3) 2.54 (1.7) 26.5 (8.4) 
Canada 10 (2.5) 5 (50.0) 2.77 (1.5) 24.4 (4.6) 
Mexico and South America 10 (2.5) 9 (90.0) 4.71 (1.9) 27.1 (6.0) 
Africa 1 (0.3) 1 (100) 5.38 (0) 23 (0) 
Total 394 234 (59.4) 3.47 (2.4)  28.4 (9.1) 
  
a Australia, Ireland, Jamaica, New Zealand, United Kingdom
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APPENDIX B 
Table B1: Study 2 Correlation Among Dependent Variables 
Table B1 
Study 2: Intercorrelations Among Dependent Variables by Cohort 











solution - .344 .309 .286 
Causal 
solution  - .268 .899** 
Temporal 
encoding   - .328 
Causal 
encoding       - 











solution - .247 .376** .295** 
Causal 
solution  - .105 .705** 
Temporal 
encoding   - .135 
Causal 
encoding    - 
** Statistically significant at p < .001 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C1: Study 3 Correlation Among Dependent Variables 
Table C1  
Study 3: Intercorrelations Among Dependent Variables 








solution - .278 .565 .316 
Causal 
solution  - .185 .481 
Temporal 
encoding   - .140 
Causal 
encoding       - 
 **Statistically significant at p < .002 
 
